NATIONAL DEFENSE-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
PENDING LEGISLATION.*

The "Bill to Increase the Efficiency of the Organized Militia
and for Other Purposes", 1 may have been intended to give
such of the militia as had agreed to serve the United States, and
taken an oath so to do when called upon, the same status as members of a volunteer arny, as heretofore defined, who have enrolled themselves to serve in the army when and where called
upon, essentially as did volunteers for the War with Spain for
example, but a "muster in" is necessary before such volunteers
are "accepted" by the government and subject to the Articles of
War.
It may be that it was intended to give men the so-called
"status" of United States soldiers by permitting them voluntarily to sign an agreement to serve when and where called upon
and thus virtually to enroll themselves in the service of the
United States by signing the agreement and taking the oath, but
allowing them, until called by the President with the consent of
Congress, to remain under the exclusive control of the governors
of the respective states as commanders-in-chief. They would
thus remain militia while subject to state control but would be
taken by the United States under the power "to raise armies" 2
and not under the power over the militia, 3 thus rendering them.
available for foreign service, which if taken as militia .they
would not be.
With reference to the control over volunteer organizations
and the question as to whether the fact that they would become
volunteers under the call would disturb or destroy state control
*Continued from the February number, 64 UNIV. OF PENNA. L REv. 347.
'"Militia Pay Bill," so called, introduced by Senator Chamberlain, 63rd
Congress, 2nd Session. as S. 6217; also 64th Congress,; ist session (Dec. 1,
1915), as S.

i158. The contents are identical but section numbers are dif-

ferent. Section 33 in S. 6217 is Sec. 32 in S. iT58; Sec. 34 is Sec. 33; See.
38 is Sec. 37; Sec. 38a is 37a, etc.
2Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution of the United States.
'Ibid., Art. I, Sec. &
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we find that previous to such "muster in" such persons as have
enrolled themselves, or otherwise indicated their intention to
enter the volunteer service, continue subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the governors of the respective states. By
undergoing the process of "muster in" such organizations of
volunteers may be "accepted" into the military service of the
United States and pass out of state control and into the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United States as part of
4
its volunteer forces.
The entry of a soldier into the service of the United States
consists of two acts of volition. 5 One is the offer to enter the
service and the other the accepting and carrying out of the offer.
The enrollment for service is only a proposal to enter such service,6 a declaration or readiness to do so, and before a man who
makes such declaration can become a soldier in the military
service of the United States it is necessary that his proposal be
accepted by a duly authorized representative of the United States.
This acceptance is manifested by the "muster in."
It would seem therefore that even an "agreement to serve"'7
may not be sufficient to bring such men, members of the militia,
under the jurisdiction of the United States but that a "muster
in"may be necessary if reliance is to be placed upon the miltia
coming into the United States service as volunteers as heretofore
defined.
Must such men be formally "mustered in" or will some less
formal act constitute such muster, particularly when considered
in connection with the agreement to serve? It has been repeatedly
held that "to give a citizen the status of the United States soldier
. . .his consent and that of the United States are both necessarv, and the formality which makes the agreement of the two
parties to the contract and the commencement of the obligation
thereunder is the muster in"."
'Howland's Dig. Op. J. A. G. of the Army, p.
'Ilowland Dig. Op. J. A. G., o41.
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°-'3 Op. Atty. Gen. U. S.406.

'S. 62,n- 63rd Congress. 2nd Session. Section 38.
23. Op. Atty. Gen. 4(8; Howland Dig. Op. J. A. G. 5o42.
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It long has been recognized that a "muster in" is "the final
act which closes a contract between a person and the Government and fixes certain relations between them"9 but it has likewise been held that a "constructive muster in" meets the
requirements of law equally with a formal muster. A "muster
in"is not necessarily formal. In some cases indeed there was no
formal "muster in," and it has been held that placing a man on
duty or availing of his services, or treating him as duly in the
military service, or paying him as a soldier, or taking his name
upon the rolls and accepting his services as a soldier, was a "con10
structive muster in".
In other words if a man's services are accepted and he is
duly paid as a soldier, such treatment implies full acceptance of
the contract of enrollment and enlistment in the army and no
further evidence as, for instance, formal examination and oath,
is necessary in order that he be considered as having assumed
the status of a soldier in the Army of the United States. If
therefore the elements exist in the relations between such men
and the United States a formal "muster in" has been waived, notwithstanding that mere enrollment creates only a liability of men
enrolled to be called and does not put them into the military
11
service of the United States.
The sections of the act as a whole seem to provide for a sort
of volunteer militia, placing the men who sign the "agreement to
serve" and who have taken an oath "in the army" in the position
of having assumed an obligation which is a continuing contract
in the nature of a status as a United States soldier.
Until such time as Congress consents that they "be ordered
into the active military service of the United States" such militia
are under the control of the respective governors but when Congress has consented, they may be considered as "mustered in"
and their full status determined by such consent and order without further formality. If, therefore, a militiaman had indicated
his refusal to serve in the army of the United States by some
'Howland's Dig. Op. J. A. G. 1o43.
"See citations in Howland Dig. Op. J. A. G. io4t.
"Howland Dig. Op. J.A. G. 623.

452

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA IV REVIEW

act, as the repudiation of. the agreement or othervise, before
consent by Congress or the issuance of an order, he would probably be subject only to penalty and not to the Articles of War,
but if no such action were taken, and such action is highly improbable, before consent by Congress and order issued, he would
be "accepted" and compelled to serve, or failing, would be subject to the Articles of War, and that regardless of any action
which the state authorities might or might not take.
Section thirty-four of the act 12 provides that the muster
shall take place when the militiamen "shall be called forth in
the manner hereinbefore prescribed" so the act itself contemplates that full status in the army shall not be obtained until
muster has taken place, which shall be only when Congress has
given its consent and the militia has been ordered to active service. This refers to the use of the militia as such under the
power of Coagress over the militia and not to the power of
Congress "to raise armies."
But has not the miltiaman who has not only enlisted to
serve the state but also has "voluntarily subscribed an agreement
to serve the United States

.

and taken an oath

.

' 3

.

in the Army of the United States" done something more than
become a member of the militia and enroll for services with the
United States?
The agreement to serve and the oath, would seem to be
something more than mere enrollment, for enrollment seems to
create only a liability of men so enrolled to be called out and does
not put them into service. 14 While it is true that this agreement
does not put such men in service strictly, for this is not fully
accomplished without certain other steps as hereafter outlined,
nevertheless such men are under oath to serve, and following a
lawful order by the President, could be punished under the
Articles of War for failure to serve.
This agreement and oath and the operation of the same to
create the dual obligation to serve seems to violate no constitu"S. 62z7, 63rd Congress. 2nd Session.
1Section 38, S_ 6217.
" llowlandI Dig. Op. J. A. G. 623.
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tional principle.

The clause of the Constitution under which

such a question might he raised provides, "No state shall, with-

out the consent of Congress keep troops". 1

But compare the

language of this clause with that of another clause in the sme
section of the Constitution: "No state shall enter into any treaty,
alliance, or confederation: grant letters of marque and reprisal
,01' It is evident in the latter clause that no state is under
any circumstances to enter into a treaty or'do the other prohibited
acts, but in the former clause it is only provided that no state
shall so act without the consent of Congress.
And if militia having taken such an oath are considered to
be "troops" within the meaning of the Constitution, will not
Congress e taken to have consented by provisions such as here
discussed incorporated in a bill providing for the organization of
such militia?
However keeping state militia under arms according to a
state code or subject to state control is not to "keep troops"
within the meaning of the Constitution. And when they pass
from the control of the state to that of the United States with
the consent of Congress. they are in any event, no longer state,
but federal, troops. Active militia organized and enrolled under
a state military code for discipline and not for military service,
except in case they are called out to execute the laws,- suppress
insurrection or repel invasion, have been held not to be "troops"*
within the meaning of the Constitution. The fact that parts or
the whole of such militia have agreed to respond to the call of the
President, with the consent of Congress, would hardly make them
"troops" until such call and consent had been given, for, as heretofore shown, they are not considered "part of the army" until
mustered, actually or constructively, and until then are under the
jurisdiction of the respective states. And they are not "troops"
unless part of the "army", for "troops" and "army" are synonymous terms. 17
'Art. 1. Sec. to. Clause 3.
"Art. 1. Sec. to. Clause i.
State. v. Wagener, 74 Minn. 318 (OWI'#.
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It may be considered settled that active militia organized
under a state statute do not come within the prohibition of the
Constitution, even though such militia may be subject to federal
service. The Supreme Court of Illinois has said upon this
subject :18
"I.exicographers and others define militia, and so the common
lnderstanding is, to be 'a bod, of armed citizens trained to military
duty, who may be called out in certain cases, but may not be kept
on service like standing armies in time of peace'. That is the case
as to the active militia of this state. The men comprising it come
from the body of the militia, and when not engaged at stated periods
in drilling and other exercises, they return to their usual avocations,
as is usual with militia, and are subject to call when the public
exigencies demand it. Such an organization no matter by what name
it may be designated. comes within no definition of 'troops' as the
word is used in the Constitution. The word 'troops' conveys to the
mind the idea of an armed body of soldiers, whose sole occupation
is war or service answering to tle Regular Army. The organization
of the active militia of the state bears no likeless to such a body of
men. It is simply a domestic force as distinguished from regular
'troops' and is only liable to be called into service when the exigencies of the state make it necessary."
In many ways the militia are similar to men of the Regular
Army or "troops" so called. The Constitution has provided that
Congress is "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining
the militia" 1 9 and Congress did by the Act of 19o3 provide for
the same sort of equipment for the militia as is used in the army
and that they be like the army in other respects. Moreover they
are drilled in armed encampment in the same manner and after
the same plan as the army and by army officers.
The essential difference is that the army is governed by the
President and by officers appointed by the President, with the
consent of the Senate. and acts under the rules and regulations
of Congress, the army. and the Secretary of War, and are
always on duty and paid accordingly, while the militia observes
mainly the rules or codes of the respective states and are only in
the service when they are called out on some duty by the state
authorities or by Congress under its powers in the Constitution.
"Dunn v. People. 44 111. 130 (879).

'Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause i6.
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at other times attending to their business or professional occupations. Congress, and the President, and the Secretary of Var
have large powers over the militia even when not in actual setvice. however, and the full extent of these powers has been fully
20
tested.
The militia, it will be seen, therefore, cannot properly be
called "troops" within the meaning of the prohibition of the Constitution, or if they be so considered, Congress will be taken to
have consented by the legislature and so have complied with the
Constitution.
But an important question at once arises. The militia who
have signed the agreement to serve and have taken the oath being
volunteers, and assuming that by the agreement they have done
something more than "enroll" so that no formal muster is necessary, or that the call would constitute a constructive muster, and
that their maintenance by the states, at least in part during times
of peace, is not a violation of the Constitution. are they available
for service without the boundaries of the United States? In.
other words, can the government compel such militia to perform
foreign service without having them expressly volunteer for it?
The Act provides:
"That the President with the consent of Congress, in time of
war, or when war is imminent, or in grave intenational emergency
requiring the use of troops in excess of the Regular Army of the
United States, may order into the active military setlvice of the
United States as a part of the army thereof any portion of the
Organized Militia having subscribed the agreement and oath
.
. shall be available
and any Organized 'Militia so ordered
for any duty for which the Regular Army may be employed.
"2"
.

Is this language" effective for the purpose intended, and does it
meet the constitutional objections to the provisions of the present
statute known as the "Dick Bill" ?22
Whether the militia as such can be called to serve with the
regular army on any service which would include foreign serviceSee War Department Circular No. 8, issued by Secretary of War
August 1, 1913.

Section 38a, S. 6217.
Act of January 21, i903, and amendment of igo8.
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has been a much discussed question of constitutional law with
the undoubted weight of the authorities recognizing the enumerated instances in which the iilitia may be used as the extent of
the power and barring the right to use the militia in any.other
capacity than "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insur-'
rections and repel invasions." 2 It is said that under these terms
such use is restricted to use within our own boundaries, except
possibly in case of repelling invasion.
The so-called Dick Bill of i903 was ahnost a re-enactmentof
the Bill of 179, governing the militia. Section four provided
that the militia shall be called out whenever the United States
is invaded. ot in danger of invasion from any foreign nation
or rebellion against the authority of the government, or whenever
the President is unable, with the regular forces, to execute the
laws of the Union. Congress was impelled to enact the legislation, and make use of the power, which had been dormant for
over a hundred -ears, to organize. to ann. and to discipline the
militia, by revolutions growing out of the War with Spain in
1898. It was found at that time that the militia of the different
states were not uniformly organized, armed, or disciplined, and
the bitter experience resulting from the consequent disappointment, delay, sickness, and death led Congress to bestir itself to
create a more satisfactory system which would prevent a recurrence of such unnecessary and, what might have been against
a stronger power, wholly disastrous confusion.
The amendment of 19o8 to the Dick Bill provided that when
the miltia are called out it shall be for the term of. their enlistment, whereas the Dick Bill. as a compromise in order to insure its passage by Congress. had included a provision that they
should serve nine months. Italso provided that when the militia
are called they shall be preferred to any "volunteer force," using
that term in its commonly accepted sense and not as herein
defined. .\nd the amendment further provided that when the
militia are called out. they may be called for service "either within
or without the territory of the Uinited States;"
'Art. I. Sec. 8. Clause

i_.

Constitution of United States.

.VA TION.AlL DEFENSE-PN.DING LEGISLA1 TION

With reference to this question of foreign service the Attornev General of the United States, Mir. Wickershani,.in response to a request by the Secretary of War for an opinion as
to whether the President has authority to send the Organized
Militia into a foreign country with the Regular Army as part of
ati army of occupation, especially should the United States intervene in the affairs of such country under conditions short of
actual warfare, said :24
"From very early times, in both England and this country,
the militia has always been considered and treated as a military
body quite distinct and different from the regular or standing army,
governed by different laws and rules, and equally different as to
the time, place or occasion of its service. One of the most notable
points of difference is this: While the latter was in the continued
service of the Government and might be called into active service
at all times and in all places when armed force is required for any
purpose, the militia could be called into the actual service.of the
Government only in the four special cases provided for by law.
Their service has always been considered as of a rather domestic
character, for the protection and defense of their own country, and
the enforcement of its laws. . .
"When the Constitution gives to Congress the power 'to raise
and support armies' and to provide 'for calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions', and makes the President 'the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and the militia of the
several states when called into the actual service of the United
States' it is speaking of two different bodies, the one the Regular
Armv, in the continuous service of the Government, and liable to
be called into active service at any time or in any place when armed
force is required; and the other a body for domestic service, and
liable to be called into the service of the Government only upon
the particular occasions named in the Constitution, any acts of Congress relating to the army and the militia must have the same construction.
"It is certain that it is only upon one or more of these three
occasions-when it is necessary to suppress insurrections, repel
invasions, or to execute the laws of the United States-that even
Congress can call this militia into the service of the United States
or authorize it to be done . ..
"I think that the constitutional provisions here considered
*

by the careful enumeration of the three occasions or pur-

poses for which the militia may be used . . . forbid such use
for any other purpose; and your question is answered in the negative."
Opinion of Attorney General. Feb. 17. i29i2, 29 Opinions Atty. Gen. 323.
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This opinion undoubtedly correctly states the law and the
provisions of the Dick Bill upon the subject are no doubt unconstitutional. It was the intention that the "militia" should be used
mainly, if not solely, for domestic purposes.
But we are here but indirectlv concerned with the provisions of the present statute, the so-called )ick Bill, upon the
subject. The question is: Do the provisions in the proposed
bill 21 meet the objections? The objections raised apply to the
use for foreign service of the militia as such. If entering into
the agreement to serve and taking the oath makes such of the
militia as sign the agreement and -take the oath something more
than militia, that is. makes them volunteers in fact under the
power of Congress "to raise armies", which volunteers are accepted by the government by a muster, constructive in character,
then the above restrictions do not apply and such militia may be
used for foreign service.26
Whether or not sections thirty-eight and thirty-eight a of
the bill under discussion are constitutional. depends upon the extent of the various grants of power to Congress with reference
to military power. together with certain inherent national powers.
The Congress of the United States is given power (x) "to
provide ; r calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
Union. suppress insurrections and repel invasions";27 and (2)
**to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia,
and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the
service of the United States. reserving to the states respectively
the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training
the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. 28
The Congress is also given power (I) "to declare war,
grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning
captures on land and sea", 2-' (2) "to raise and support armies",3 1
'Sections ,i8 and 38a. S. 6217.
- See opinion by the writer as Judge Advocate General of .Illinois,
"Militia Pay Bill." H. R. 8141, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session.
'Art I. Sec. 8. Cl. *5.
Const. of United States.
Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 16, Ibid.
"Art. 1. Sec. 8. Cl. ii, Ibid.
"Art. I,Sec. 8. Cl. 12, Ibid.
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1
(3) "to provide and maintain a navy",3 (4) "to make rules

for the government, and regulation of the land and naval
forces". 3 2
The Constitution further provides:
"The President shall be .conunander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states,
when called into the actual service of the United States." si
The Congress and the respective states each have authority
over the militia of such states, but when there is a conflict of
particular authority, Congress is supreme because its power is
plenary.3 4 The extent of these grants of power to Congress
always has been the subject of much debate and considerable
litigation.
The power of Congress to use the "militia" as such is limited
to that section which provides for "calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union. suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions",3 5 and its only other power over the "militia" as such is
found in the clause with reference to their organization, arming,
and discipline. Its power is strictly limited to the purposes hereinbefore set forth and what may be reasonably implied from the
3
words used. It is a grant of power and is not to be exceeded .
The remaining power is left to the respective states.
As has been seen from the opinion of the Attorney General
of the United States 37 and the views expressed herein, the provision of the present Dick Law which provides for the transfer
of the militia to the army for service within or without the-territorial limits of the United States, is not constitutional. It is not
within the plain intent and certain meaning of the language bf
the Constitution heretofore discussed. We must look to the
constitutional power of Congress "to raise armies" -1 if we are

"Art. I,Sec.

8, C1. r3, Ibid.
"Art. I, Sec. 8, CL x4, Ibid.
3 Art. II,Sec. 2, CI. x, Ibid
Gibbons v.Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 1 (824).
"'Art. I. Sec. 8, C1. i5,, Const. U. S.

"Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, note 34.
See supra, note 24.
Art. I, Sec. 8, C1. ia,Const. U. S.
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to sustain the constituti,nalitv of any act looking to the use for
foreign service of
part o, the militia, and not to any power
which Congress has over the militia as such.
The power to raise armies has been held to be unlimited.
It has been said of Congress in this respect:
-Te creation of these powers fall within the line of its duties;
and its control over the subject is plenary and exclusive. It can
determine without question from any state authority how the armies
shall be raised, whether bv voluntary enlistment or by forced draft,
the age at which a soldier shall be received.
. .
No reservation of power was left by the Constitution to the
states to raise armies and we have found that it was specifically
denied them to keep "'troops" or armies of any kind, except with
the consent of Congress. The power of Congress then being
unlimited and exclusive, great scope can be given to the power
"to raise armies" bui in the exercise of it, care should be taken
that the rights of the respective states are not encroached upon. 40
In the exercise of the power of the President with the consent of Congress to call forth such militia "in time of war. or
when war is imminent, or in grave international emergency" as
provided for in the legislation in question. 41 Congress has power
over the state militia and over individuals composing it or the
individual citizens of a state, superior to that of the states them-elves. Congress is supreme in all that pertains to war for it
alone has power "to declare war". 42 but the power over the militia
is exercised or rather exists concurrently in some cases. With
reference to the nilitia, in the absence of legislation by Congress
"to provide for organizing, arming an( disciplining the militia" 13
the state authorities can pass laws governing the same, but when
Congress acts, as it did in 1903 and in i9oS.and as it is proposed
to do now, then the particular legislation so enacted becomes
the law. and state laws on this particular matter or subject,
if they are inconsistent with the acts of Congress, are ren' Tarble'
01 Art. 11,
' Section
"Art. I.
' Art. I,

Case. %3I-all. 37, at p. 438 (U. S. 1871).
Const. U S.
18a.
Sec. 8. Cl. ix. Const. U. S.
Sec. 8. Cl. 16, Ibid.
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dered nugatory. 44 Although the power with reference to the
militia is not exclusive when Congress never has exercised its
power to organize. arm. and discipline the militia, such laws are
the supreme law of the land, and all interfering state statutes
45
or regulations must necessarily be suspended in their operation.
The Secretary of \Var has recently strikingly exercised this
power and by Executive order has promulgated rules and regulations for the organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia,

claiming the right under the powers conferred upon him through
certain legislation by Congress under this grant of power, and
such regulations have been carried into effect, though contrary
to state statutes and in violation of state regulations. And notwithstanding this, the states have accepted them and have been
compelled to accept them if they desired to participate in federal
allotment to militia. 4" This indicates how far the government
might go toward federalizing the militia even under present
inadequate legislation, if it makes up its mind to depend upon
it and to exercise its power to its fullest extent
But while the power of Congress over the militia is concurrent in some instances with that of the states, the power of
Congress over war and the armies necessary to conduct war is
exclusive. 47 If the use of the members of the militia making the
agreement and taking the oath, is based upon the power of Congress to raise armies it is exclusive, and from the moment of
acceptance destroys state control. They are taken as "volunteers" and not as "militia" and the President may, notwithstanding the provisions of the Constitution with reference to the appointment of officers of the militia49 by the states,"" retain or
change the officers at his discretion.
"Opinion of Justices, 14 Gray 614
'I ouston v. Moore. 5 Wheaton I
" War Department Circular No. 8.
See also Report of Efficiency
T. 1913.
1915, p. 896.
4"Tarble's Case. supra. note 39.

(fass.

1859).

(182o)..

issued by Secretary of War, Aug.
and Economy Commission, Illinois,

" Art. I. See. 8. Cl. 16. Const. U. S.
"Volunteer Act of TOT4. Act of Apr. 25. 1074. See also Report of
Efficiency and Economy Committee. Illinois. 1915. p. 896.
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The bill under discussion declares who shall compose the
militia" ° and with reference to that subject acts under the
power of Congress under the Constitution to organize the
militia. 5 1 It provides for those members of the militia who sign
an agreement to serve, and take an oath to serve in the army
when ordered with the consent of Congress, and creates thereby
a class or grade of militia distinct from those not entering into
such an obligation. It classifies the militia, splits it into two
parts, (x) those signing an agreement and taking an oath to
serve, and (2) those not signing the agreement or taking the
oath. It is in terms stating the composition of the militia. The
power to determine who shall compose the militia is vested in
Congress, and after it has been exercised by Congress, a state
legislature cannot constitutionally5 2 provide for the enrollment of
any other persons in the militia.
The power of Congress to organize the militia is plenary
and whenever exercised by Congress all state laws inconsistent
therewith are null and void. This power to organize means to
bring all parts into effective and systematic correlation and cooperation. The courts have said, "Organizing obviously includes
the power of determining who shall compose the body known as
the militia".55
The term "organize" has further been used to include arranging the groups or units of organization, and prescribing the
number, grade, and functions of the officers and men composing
the organization." The power to organize looks also to the
organization or arrangement of the militia into divisions, regi55
ments, etc.
It is seen therefore that the power to organize covers a wide
field of operations. It hardly can be disputed that if Congress is
given the right to classify or divide the militia into the organized
Sections 38 and 38.
'1 Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. j6, Const. U. S.
Opinion of Justices, supra, note 44.

*Ibid.
14 Statutes 22, Statutes 132, 3 Statutes 96, 9 Statutes

268, 30 Statutes 361.
Tucker's Constitution, p. s83.

12,

72 Statutes
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and the unorganized militia, anti has power further to divide the
organized militia into divisions, brigades, regiments, or other
tactical units, it would likewise have power to divide the
Organized Militia still further so that it would be classified as,
(i) men who are liable for any federal service, having signed
an agreement and taken an oath to serve, and (2) men who are
liable only for such service as the militia can be used for under
the Constitution, and who have not signed an agreement or taken
an oath to serve. Of course, however, it could not encroach upon
the rights of the states or the individuals comprising the militia.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said 6
"Congress has power to provide for organizing, arming and
disciplining the militia, and this power being unlimited except in
the two particulars of officering and training them, according to

the discipline to be prescribed by Congress, it may be exercised to
any extent that may be deemed necessary by Congress."
The.right of Congress being clear, as against the states, to
organize the militia, to classify them, to arrange them in tactical
units, we turn to the question whether the exercise of that
power violates any constitutional rights of the individual citizen.
The citizen is secured under the Constitution, the inalienable right
of life, liberty and property.57 His power to contract is a right
of property from which he cannot be deprived without due
process of law 58 and in contracting he may voluntarily enter into
any contract to dispose of that property, providing df course he
does not contravene some other law in so doing.
To sign an agreement to serve, in the state militia and in the
United States Army, or to sign an enrollment, is a legal contract.
It is an agreement which constitutes an offer which the citizen
has the legal right to make, and acceptance by the Government,
either by.pay, constructive muster, or actual service results in a
contract. 9 It is no less a contract because it is entered into with
the sovereign, although for a breach of it the militiaman could
Houston v. Moore, supra, note 45, at p. 6.
"Art. V. Amends. to the Const.; Art. XIV, Amends. to the Const.
"In
Ritchc
v People. U. S. n8-(W8z-).
so
re Grimley.
137 U. S. 147 (8OM.
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not sue." The signing of such an agreement or enrollment creates a relation in the nature of a status. but as in the case of a
marriage, it is no less a contract, rather it is more than a contract,
with certain rights and obligations annexed to it!1
As heretofore pointed out, the agreement to serve contemplated by the act under discussion may or may not have been intended to be an "enrollment" in the army, but legally it amounts
to that. At any rate such "agreement" is a contract between the
members of the militia and the United States, the consideration
being a certain percentage of the regular army pay to be paid
the militiaman in return for the agreement to serve the United
States whenever called with the consent of Congress. The principal element of a valid contract is present, a detriment*to the
promisee-the militiaman who agrees to serve. The transaction
82
constitutes a valid offer and acceptance.
If, then, such classification of the Organized Militia does
not seem to contravene any existing law, and such organization
of the militia into two parts or grades, under the power given to
Congress "to provide for organizing the militia" is proper, and
such agreement to serve when called is a legal contract based
upon consideration, has Congress the further power to use such
militia, having signed such agreement and taken an oath, and
in pursuance thereof having bcen called into active service, for
any purpose for which the regular army may be used?
It must be remembered that the militia and the army are two
distinct forces and that the Constitution in referring to them,
does so clearly and distinctly as separate bodies.6 3 Congress
in acting under the clause used in section thirty-eight a of the
bill discussed, can call out the militia but in so doing must act
under constitutional authority and can use the militia only for
constitutional purposes.
The bill provides that such militia may be called out in
three instances: (i) "In time of war, or (2) when war is im" Art. XI, Amends. to the Const
" h re Grimley. supra, note 59.
"Anson on Contracts. 2nd Amer. Ed., 12, 13.
" Art. 1.Sec. 8, CI. 12, is,16; Art. II,Sec.

2,

CI. x, Const. U. S.
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minent, or (3)in grave international emergency"."
is given control over the militia only for certain specified purposes; it has power over the army at all times, and under all
circumstances. Its power to use the militia, heretofore shown,
is limited to three purposes: (i) "To execute the laws of the
Union, (2) to suppress insurrections, and (3) to repel invasions". 5 All of these then are, in general, war purposes. An
insurrection is a warlike uprising against the civil or political
government which usually results in war although there may not
be a declaration of war.06 However war can be waged without
a declaration of war, as an example of which we have the recent
occupation of Vera Cruz. An invasion is a warlike entrance into
another domain ;6T and even in executing the laws of the Union
war may result; so that in each of the instances in which the
militia may be called out, a state of war exists.
The act, then, enumerates three instances in which militia
may be called, and all these three relate to a state of war or to
a national or international emergency following which a state
of war may exist. Such call is well within the constitutional
rights of Congress. The theory of the bill is, however, that the
militia can only be called out according to the provisions of the
Constitution with reference to the militia, for section thirty-three
says :68

"That whenever the United States is invaded or in danger
of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the
authority of the Government of the United States, or the President
is unable with the regular forces at his command to execute the
-laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth
such number of the militia . . . as he may deem necessary to
repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to
execute such laws. . .
The question then again arises whether the militia-for they
are still militia, though perhaps not mere militia, when the call
comes--can be called for use in foreign service. According to
"Section 38a.
"Art. 1,Sec. 8, CI. is, U. S. Const.
"Webster's International Dictionary.
t Ibid.
46S. 6217
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the Constitution, as before stated, militia can be called out for
only the specified purposes. But according to the better opinion 0 and clearly under the Volunteer Act of 1914.0 militia
companies becoming a part of the army are no longer militia
but volunteers, and still now under the provisions of this act
proposed, having signed the agreement, they would as soon as
called to active service, become a part of the Army of the United
States, subject to all the rules and regulations of the army including the Articles of War. They are ordered in as the act
says, "as a part of the army"." Why is not this power exercised
not under the power over the militia but under the power to
raise armies? If so they are subject to foreign service.
The power of Congress to raise armies has been tested. The
general rule always followed is that the power of the nation
to protect itself and preserve its own integrity is unlimited. During the Civil War numnerous cases arose questioning the constitutionality of the draft and conscript acts, both of the United
States and of the Confederate States, compelling men from
eighteen to forty-five years to be available for service in the
army, in which cases it was held that no one but the governor
of the state was exempt. This included members of the state
organized militia as well as of the unorganized militia. No
question of course arose as to the ability of Congress to use
these men so drafted or conscripted into service without the
boundaries of the country, but it is illustrative of the measures
which Congress can adopt to defend the country and its integrity
under the power to raise and support armies.7 2
These conscript cases brought under consideration the question of the constitutionality of the power as exercised by Congress under its power to raise armies granted by the constitution. The Federal )raft Law was sustained, in litigation resuiting from its enforcement, in several statesJ4
Efficiency and Economy Commission, Illinois, igi, p. 896.
Act of Apr. 25, 19t4.
'Section 380.
"See McCall's Case, s Phila. 259 (Pa. 1863) ; Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa.
'

Kneedler v. Lane, supra. note 72.
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In a number of the Confederate States, the supreme courts
passed upon the validity of conscript acts and sustained them, the
Confederate States having in their constitution practically the
same provisions as the Constitution of the United States with
reference to military powers. The Supreme Court of Georgia
said :74
"The Constitution makes it the dtifty of the Confederate States
to 'protect each of the states against invasion'. To do this they
must have the ability to place an adequate military force in the
field; hence power was given to the Congress by one clause, 'to
raise armies'; by another, 'to provide and maintain a navy'; and
by a third, 'to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the
laws of the Confederate States, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions'."
And a number of cases upheld generally the forced draft
or conscription into the army of those men even who bad sent
substitutes in their places, the court asserting that the power
of the Confederate States to uphold its integrity was of primary
importance, the power to raise armies for the defense thereof
was unlimited, and the compulsory enrolling acts therefore
constitutional. 7"

If, then, the power of Congress to raise armies extends so
far as to compel compulsory enrollment of civilians, it cannot
be doubted that the plan of voluntary enrollment under the
power to raise armies would be legal. Certainly if a forced draft
is constitutional, other enforcement of a contract under which a
man has voluntarily enrolled himself and assumed a military
status, would be legal. If his constitutional rights are not violated in the former case, they cannot be infringed in the latter.
It has been held that Congress has "the constitutional power
The
to raise armies either by contract or coercion". 7forced draft is coercion of course: the plan here proposed is by
contract only with no trace of coercion unless it be in the enforcenment of a contract voluntarily assumed and for which a
"Barber v. Irwin. 34 Ga. 28. at p. 31 (1864).
"Ex parte Coupland. --65Texas. 383 (1862) ; Ex tarte Tate, 39 Ala. 254

(18641 : Jeffries v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347 (1862),
" Burroughs v. Peyton. 16 Grat. 470 (Va. 1,64).
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consideration has been reccived. However in either case Congress is acting within the scope of its constitutional powers.
Now if the cases discussed with reference to the power to
draft have excluded from the application of such power any
part of the organized militia, all of the cases on the contrary
assert the view by broad and emphatic language that the militia
shall not be excluded from draft, and in the Confederate States,
under similar language, the courts held specifically that the organized militia, as individuals, are subject to the power of Congress to raise armies. The Court of Appeals of Virginia said :
"It was not probable that in the exercise of the power to raise
armies, Congress would, under ordinary circumstances, intentionally
diminish the number of the militia. But it cannot be true that, with
a view to preserving the militia entire it was intended to deny to
Congress the right to take individuals belonging to it into the regular army."
The power of Congress over war is exclusive. The states
cannot declare war. As a necessary part of this power Congress
was further empowered to raise and support armies, and as has
been previously stated, this power is plenary and exclusive. The
power as given in the Constitution carries with it many subordinate powers. It has been said, "The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress, the power to execute in the President.
Both powers imply many subordinate and auxiliary powers.' ' 8
The Constitution specifies the ends to be obtained or the
limits within which Congress may act-it has power "to raise
and support armies". 0 This necessarily implies many subordinate powers to accomplish that object and it must perforce enact
various laws to carry out the general power.. The power to
raise armies, as has been seen, is unlimited and can be used even
to the extent of a draft to force a man to serve.8 0
There could be no real doubt as to the constitutionality of
the proposed bill, if the use of such militia in time of war were
placed clearly under the power to raise armies and not under
"Ibid.
-'Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (iLW6).
Art. I,Sec. 8, CL 12, Const. U. S.
Kneedler v. Lane, supra, note 72.
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the powers with reference to the militia,-had the word "draft"
been used instead of the word "order"."1 The word draft was
originally used in prior wordings of similar proposed legislation
but has since been eliminated as repugnant to the general idea
and principle of the act, because the principle of voluntarily assuming the obligation to serve, in consideration of certain benefits, is the plan of the bill, with no thought of compulsion. The
use of the word "draft", due largely to the Civil War history
of it, is obnoxious to the volunteer and robs him from his point
of view of the credit due him for voluntarily assuming the obligation. This feeling is not confined to this country and has recently been made use of for recruiting purposes/as, for instance,
in the Duty Campaign for volunteers in England.
The proposed plan constitutes a voluntary enrollment in a
volunteer force held in reserve but subject to acceptance by the
government at any time and subject to continuing obligations. It
violates, as has been seen, no constitutional rights either as to the
states or as to the individuals. It does not prevent the citizen
from becoming or remaining a member of the state militia, for
by merely signing the agreement he does not pass from the control of the state but remains subject to it until he has been accepted by the government by a muster, actual or constructive, or
by service, or by other indication amounting to acceptance.
There being no limit to the power of Congress to raise armies,
there can be no constitutional objection to calling out the militia
as a whole or as individuals, or to calling only those individuals
in the militia who have signed in advance an agreement to serve
and taken an oath so to do. The power to raise armies, as has
been seen, is plenary with no fixed limitations, and can be exercised to the full extent necessary to accomplish the necessary
8 2-

end.

The dual character of the militia exists not only under this
legislation but inherently so under the Constitution. It was intended that both the state and nation should have certain powers
Section 38.
Tarble's Case, supra, note 39.
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over it. But Congress was given exclusive control over the
armies and the raising and maintaining of them. It was not
limited as to when it might recruit those armies. It is limited
as to the use of militia as such. but would seem to be free to
use such militia as had so enrolled in the volunteer army, free
from the restriction as to militia and as a part of its power to
raise armies.
The power of Congress cannot be held to be hampered in
the exercise of its unlimited and necessary power to raise armies
by the fact that one who desires to volunteer his services to the
government is at the time a member of the state militia. Otherwise it is conceivable the government might be deprived of the
necessary force. It was held in Texas during the Civil War
that the right of the state should be disregarded during the time
the militia is needed by Congr"ess, for the state must yield to the
pressing need of the nation. The court said :83
"The individual is usually an arms-bearing citizen whether he
goes with the service voluntarily or otherwise. For surely the doctrine is not to be advanced that individuals, companies, or regiments
of the well-regulated arms-bearing citizens necessary to the existence
of a free state which have been organized, armed, and disciplined
as provided for by Congress and for whom a call is made by the
Confederate States in pursuance of the Constitution, cease to be
integral parts of the arms-bearing citizens of the state because they
preferred to vohnteer their services directly
'i to the Confederate
Government and it is willing to accept them.
If the power of Congress is such that it can claim militia as
individual volunteers, no state right would seem to be violated
by- calling out in groups or divisions such militia as had agreed
to serve. It has been shown -that the right of the state over the
individual militiaman is subordinate to the right of Congress
when it exercises its power. Whether called individually, as they
could be to the last man, or collectively, the power of Congress
is plenary and exclusive.
There remains still another question. When such militia
are called and are fully a part of the army of the United States.
the question of officers arises, as to what grade they would asSE.r parte Coupland. supra, note 75.
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sume, what rank they would hold, whether the same as in the
militia or in different grades or ranks, and whether the state or
the President should appoint the officers. It appears to be the
intention of the act s4 that such militia shall be organized so
far as practicable according to the law and regulations of the
regular army, and shall be taken by divisions, brigades, regiments, or independent or separate organizations, including all'
officers, according to the regulations for corresponding recruits
of the regular army.
But as heretofore pointed out, when such militia are taken
into the army of the United States they are no longer militia
according to the best opinion, but volunteers, and the form of the
organization and the grade and rank of the officers would be
subject to the discretion of the President. 5 A contrary view
has been given from the office of the Attorney General of the
United States,68 but it has not been generally accepted as correctly stating the law.
In conclusion it is submitted that the power exists under
the Constitution to bring the militia under full federal control
for all purposes, including foreign service, by clearly basing the
action upon the power to raise armies. It is believed the language of the present bill does it or could be made -to do it by
slight verbal changes along the lines suggested.
Nathan Villiam MacChesney:
Chicago.
"Section 39, S. 6217; See. 38, S. xIT8.
"Military Dept. of State of Ill., Efficiency and Economy Committee
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W p. Atty. Gen. U. S.,

228,

53&

